Re-thinking Minnesota\u27s Criminal Justice Response to Sexual Violence Using a Prevention Lens by Palmer, Caroline & Prowant, Bradley
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 5 Article 6
2013
Re-thinking Minnesota's Criminal Justice Response
to Sexual Violence Using a Prevention Lens
Caroline Palmer
Bradley Prowant
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Palmer, Caroline and Prowant, Bradley (2013) "Re-thinking Minnesota's Criminal Justice Response to Sexual Violence Using a
Prevention Lens," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 39: Iss. 5, Article 6.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/6
 
 
1584 
RE-THINKING MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE USING A 
PREVENTION LENS 
Caroline Palmer† and Bradley Prowant†† 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1585 
 II. SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION: REDEFINING THE 
DISCUSSION .......................................................................... 1588 
 III. RELEVANT HISTORY OF SYSTEM RESPONSES TO SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN MINNESOTA .................................................... 1592 
A. Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program ................................... 1594 
B. Practical Concerns .......................................................... 1597 
 IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT POLICY RESPONSE: THE PROBLEM 
OF INDUCTION ..................................................................... 1598 
 V. UNITING INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION RESPONSES ...... 1601 
 VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1605 
 
 
A key problem with Minnesota’s policy is that we have not 
asked the right questions.  We’ve asked “How can we lock up the 
most dangerous?”  We should be asking, “How can we prevent 
the most violence?”  We should be intensely studying the issue, 
and allocating scarce resources to a mix of programs and 
approaches whose prevention efficacy has empirical support.1 
 
 
 †  Caroline Palmer, J.D., is a staff attorney at the Minnesota Coalition 
Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA).  She is a graduate of Hamline University 
School of Law and Barnard College.  She was a policy fellow at the Hubert H. 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.   
 ††  Bradley Prowant is a third-year law student at the University of Minnesota 
Law School.  He received his B.A. in history and philosophy from the University of 
Iowa. 
 1.  Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an 
Empirically-Based Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 
1085 (2003).  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sexual violence is one of the most difficult issues we face in the 
human condition.  Anyone can be a victim—the harm knows no 
demographic boundaries.  In Minnesota, it was estimated that in 
one year more than 61,000 residents were subjected to a sexual 
assault.2  This number could nearly fill the Metrodome in 
downtown Minneapolis.  And survivors face many personal 
challenges.  Rape is among “the most severe of all traumas, causing 
multiple, long-term negative outcomes.”3  Even with the many 
strides that have occurred in recent years to support a victim-
centered response, survivors who seek help from the legal, medical, 
and mental health systems, among others, still “may face disbelief, 
blame, and refusals of help instead of assistance.”4  It is a problem 
that demands a response from all levels of society.  And yet, this 
response is lacking. 
But the inadequacy of the sexual violence response does not 
lie solely within our systems or the victim-blaming myths 
perpetuated by society and reflected in jury pools.  Public policy, 
the driving force behind the system response, has failed to see the 
big picture when it comes to the relationship between effective law 
making and sexual violence prevention and intervention.  
According to Joan Tabachnick and Alisa Klein, authors of A 
Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex Offender Policy to Prevent Child Sexual 
Abuse, “Experts agree that a criminal justice response alone cannot 
prevent sexual abuse or keep communities safe.  Yet, tougher 
sentencing and increased monitoring of sex offenders are fully 
funded in many states, while victim services and prevention 
programs are woefully underfunded.”5  An effective policy geared 
towards ending sexual violence and holding offenders accountable 
must be comprehensive in its approach, constructed with the view 
of preventing sexual violence from occurring in the first place, 
 
 2.  TED R. MILLER ET AL., PACIFIC INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, COSTS OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN MINNESOTA: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 4 (2007), 
available at http://www.pire.org/documents/mn_brochure.pdf.  The study 
contains statistics for the year 2005. 
 3.  Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual Assault 
on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 225, 225 (2009). 
 4.  Id. at 226. 
 5.  JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL 
ABUSERS, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING SEX OFFENDER POLICY TO                     
PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (2011), available at http://www.atsa.com/pdfs 
/ppReasonedApproach.pdf. 
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aggressively intervening when it does, and looking to the future to 
stop further harm. 
But current public policy is decidedly lopsided in its response, 
so focused on punishment, particularly for the worst-of-the-worst 
offenders, that there is little opportunity for ideas about 
prevention—let alone meaningful support for victims or far-
reaching rehabilitation programs for offenders—to gain serious 
traction in the discussion.  This state of affairs is driven, in part, by 
the complexity of the issues, and no one would argue that they are 
not among the most difficult and politically unpopular any 
lawmaker has to face.  Considerable public safety and public health 
concerns are at stake. 
Still, horrific headlines about sex crimes often translate into 
near-instant legislative solutions, without regard to the fact that 
there may not be a one-size-fits-all answer, that there may be a 
negative unintended consequence in some other part of the legal 
response, or that sexual violence requires a comprehensive and 
well-considered strategic approach.6  According to the Council of 
State Governments, “Some state leaders have expressed concern 
that the urgency of efforts to strengthen sex offender management 
policy is prohibiting lawmakers from fully considering the range of 
long-term impacts such policies will have.”7  Little time is spent 
reviewing the evidence or collecting expert opinion when the 
public pressure is on to punish sex offenders.  Prevention-related 
proposals are sometimes met with skepticism in this retributive 
environment because it is difficult to prove that a sexual violence 
crime did not occur and that its non-occurrence has a causal link to 
 
 6.  Id. at 21–24.  According to Tabachnick and Klein: 
There is a growing understanding that the simple solutions offered by 
legislative policies broadly applied to every offender have not been 
effective in keeping children safe or preventing sexual abuse.  
Furthermore, the isolation and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex 
offenders and their families have generated a number of unintended 
consequences that limit family, community, and societal ability to 
prevent sexual abuse in the first place.  Tough restrictive policies are 
needed for the most dangerous sex offenders in society.  But these 
policies are applied broadly and typically do not recognize the 
continuum of behaviors of sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who 
sexually abuse, and the range of risk posed by sex offenders to re-
offend. 
Id. at 42. 
 7.  See id. at 28 (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
POLICY IN THE STATES: STRENGTHENING POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/SOMFinalReport-FINAL.pdf). 
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a specific policy.8  As the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence 
(NAESV), a victim-centered organization committed to educating 
federal policymakers about best practices in the sexual violence 
response, wrote in a 2008 position statement: 
States and communities across the nation are developing 
measures to manage adult sex offenders with the express 
purpose of increasing safety for victims and communities.  
Unfortunately, not all measures currently being enacted 
do, in fact, increase safety.  Some put communities at 
higher risk, while others create a false sense of security.9 
One good example of misdirected public policy is residency 
restrictions, which, according to some studies (including one by the 
Minnesota Department of Corrections), show little success in 
preventing re-offenses or providing a reliable protective strategy for 
public safety.10  And yet, this blanket solution still holds currency 
among many policymakers.11 
Victim advocacy organizations such as NAESV and the 
Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA)12 have a 
strong interest in a robust public policy response to ending sexual 
violence.  But the response must make sense and take into account 
both prevention and intervention strategies, backed by research 
and expertise in the field.  The authors of this article contend that 
Minnesota policymakers are at a crossroads.  Policymakers have an 
unprecedented opportunity to make some important changes, ones 
that incorporate prevention and intervention strategies.  This 
opportunity comes out of necessity—not only because the harm 
 
 8.  See id.  
 9.  Id. at 27 (citing NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE, COMMUNITY 
MANAGEMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS: REGISTRATION, ELECTRONIC MONITORING, CIVIL 
COMMITMENT, MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS (2008), available 
at http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/CommunityManagement.pdf). 
 10.  Id. at 24; see MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY AND SEX 
OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 2 (2007), available at http://www.doc 
.state.mn.us/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf (finding that re-
offenses would have not been deterred by residential restrictions); see also COLO. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (2004),                                
available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/sex_offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01 
.pdf (demonstrating that residency restrictions are not deterrents to sex offense 
crimes). 
 11.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 1a (2012) (creating residency 
restrictions for some juvenile offenders). 
 12.  See MINN. COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, http://www.mncasa.org 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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persists, but also because the current system, particularly the 
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, is under close scrutiny due to 
mounting costs and looming legal challenges.13 
The key question we as a society confront is what changes will 
satisfactorily balance justice for victims with offender 
accountability, attempts at rehabilitation through treatment, and 
high community expectations about public safety.  This article 
offers background on what the discussion about prevention of 
sexual violence can look like,14 a theoretical analysis of the policy 
conundrum facing our lawmakers,15 and some examples of how 
prevention and intervention strategies can be put into practice in 
Minnesota law, as advanced through MNCASA’s legislative 
agenda,16 with the hope that a new direction can be charted toward 
the best possible public policy response for the state. 
II. SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION: REDEFINING THE DISCUSSION 
Responsibility for the prevention of sexual violence is often 
placed on the individual and most commonly manifests itself in the 
form of risk-reduction techniques such as self-defense courses, 
safety tips, the buddy system, and educational programs for 
children about good touch and bad touch.  While these tools do 
have value, they can also create a false sense of security, a belief 
that the individual alone can prevent sexual violence from 
occurring, or even a belief that it is the individual’s duty to do so.17  
The most prepared and informed person can still be a victim of 
sexual violence.  There are only so many variables that can be 
controlled, and, ultimately, it is the perpetrator who decides to 
 
 13.  See infra Part III.A. 
 14.  See infra Part II. 
 15.  See infra Part IV. 
 16.  See infra Part V. 
 17.  There are also unintended consequences related to risk-reduction 
strategies.  For example, it may not be safe to fight back during an attack, 
especially if the perpetrator has a weapon, is bigger than the victim, or employs 
some sort of coercive or threatening tactic.  Also, many risk-reduction strategies 
are focused on stranger attacks when statistics show that the victim often knows the 
assailant in some way (family, friend, intimate partner, acquaintance, fellow 
student, employee, etc.).  Non-stranger perpetrators are able to use trust against a 
victim in ways that a stranger cannot.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
sixty-four percent of female victims and forty percent of male victims of violent 
crimes knew the perpetrator.  JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 9 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf.  
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commit the crime.  Still, society continues to subscribe to beliefs 
about sexual assault that place blame on the victim.18  When 
prevention strategies focus only on the victim’s perceived 
responsibilities, without regard to the potential perpetrator’s 
criminal actions, they only serve to perpetuate the myths. 
Sexual violence prevention strategies are modeled upon a 
public-health approach.19  There are three levels of prevention 
strategies that can be applied to the analysis: primary, secondary, 
and tertiary.20  Primary prevention takes action to prevent problems 
from occurring in the first place.  It involves a systematic process 
that promotes healthy behaviors and an environment that reduces 
the likelihood or frequency of occurrence.  Secondary prevention 
is the immediate response after an incident.  It addresses short-
term consequences and is most commonly recognized as crisis 
intervention.  Victim advocacy, responses from law enforcement 
and medical providers, and community-based awareness campaigns 
describing an assault are examples of secondary prevention 
responses.  Tertiary prevention attempts to decrease the long-term 
disability associated with the problem and looks to prevent possible 
reoccurrence of the problem.  Examples of tertiary prevention 
responses are extended support and treatment for sexual assault 
survivors, sex offender treatment programs, and reform of criminal 
sexual conduct statutes.21  The justice system response is interwoven 
within the secondary and tertiary levels. 
Another common prevention analysis is the spectrum of 
prevention.  Larry Cohen developed this nationally recognized 
response model while he was director of the Contra Costa Health 
Services Prevention Program in California.22  It can be applied to a 
 
 18.  See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 293 (Minn. 2011) (“The research 
provided by the State and amici shows that the public holds and gives credence to 
rape myths.”); see also Kaarin Long et al., A Distinction Without a Difference: Why the 
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overrule Its Precedent Precluding the Admission of 
Helpful Expert Testimony in Adult Victim Sexual Assault Cases, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 569, 579–91 (2010). 
 19.  See MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE PROMISE OF PRIMARY PREVENTION OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO PREVENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND 
EXPLOITATION IN MINNESOTA 8 (2009) [hereinafter PROMISE OF PRIMARY 
PREVENTION], available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/pub/svpplan.pdf; 
see also Our Approach, PREVENTION INST., http://www.preventioninstitute.org           
/about-us/our-approach.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 20.  PROMISE OF PRIMARY PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 5. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See The Spectrum of Prevention: Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Injury 
Prevention, PREVENTION INST., http://www.preventioninstitute.org/component 
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variety of public-health concerns, from violence prevention to 
nutrition, fitness, traffic safety, and injury prevention, among many 
others.23 
There are six levels for strategy development in the spectrum 
that “are complementary and when used together produce a 
synergy that results in greater effectiveness than would be possible 
by implementing any single activity.”24  This multi-tiered approach 
creates roles for the individual, the community, and greater society: 
(1) strengthening individual knowledge and skills, (2) promoting 
community education, (3) educating providers, (4) fostering 
coalitions and networks, (5) changing organizational practices, and 
(6) influencing policy and legislation.25  The spectrum 
demonstrates that the prevention response depends on a variety of 
partners, organizing on both the grassroots and the formal systemic 
levels, to be successful.  No one person, organization, or 
policymaker can do it alone.  A variety of strategies needs to be 
deployed, and many different types of audiences (of all ages and 
developmental levels) should be targeted with specially tailored 
messages.  Participants on all levels of the spectrum are engaged 
and innovating as the problem evolves over the passage of time. 
Meaningful policy responses to sexual violence always consider 
the role of prevention.  The Governor’s Commission on Sex 
Offender Policy, convened by Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty 
from 2004 to 2005, for example, included in its recommendations 
the need for “increas[ed] attention to the prevention of sex 
crimes.”26  The Commission’s members noted: 
While the potential long-term cost savings to the public 
health system from preventing sex crimes are large—as is 
the potential to avoid suffering by victims—specific 
strategies on how to break cycles of offending are less 
clear.  The Department of Health’s work on violence 
prevention is a valuable start; and more should be done to 
develop, research and discover effective prevention 
 
/jlibrary/article/id-105/127.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  “[T]he Spectrum [of 
Prevention] is based on the work of Dr. Marshall Swift in treating developmental 
disabilities.”  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 6 (2005) 
[hereinafter GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION], available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us 
/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalreport.pdf. 
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strategies.27 
The Minnesota Department of Health later found that the cost of 
sexual violence to the state of Minnesota could be estimated at $8 
billion, or $1540 per resident, in 2005.28  These are significant 
numbers that have caught the attention of policymakers in the time 
since they were reported, but responsive action has been mostly 
limited to intervention efforts.29  To this date, no state dollars have 
been invested in sexual violence prevention.30 
It is time to shift the policy-making paradigm and prioritize 
prevention in an effective manner.31  As Tabachnick and Klein 
stated in A Reasoned Approach, “The field of public health calls for 
policies that alter developmental trajectories leading to initial 
perpetration of violence as opposed to the exclusive use of after-
the-fact responses.”32  Prevention and intervention “are not 
diametrically opposed constructs”—and as renewed attention is 
paid to improve the system response to sexual violence in 
Minnesota (and particularly the management of the sex offenders 
in the state’s expensive and controversial civil commitment 
program), there is also a renewed opportunity to promote 
innovative solutions before the harm occurs.33 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  MILLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.  The cost estimate was 3.3 times the 
costs incurred by alcohol-impaired driving.  Id. at 13.  The costs include medical 
care, mental health care, lost work, property damage, suffering and lost quality of 
life, sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, suicide acts, substance abuse, 
victim services/out-of-home placement, investigation/adjudication, 
sanctioning/treatment, earning loss while confined, and primary prevention.  Id.  
It is believed that the $8 billion figure is actually low because several costs, such as 
those borne by counties, were not included in the study.  Id. at 10. 
 29.  See infra Part III. 
 30.  See Sexual Violence Prevention Program, MINN. DEPARTMENT HEALTH, 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/topic/svp/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2013).  Current funding for the Minnesota Department of Health’s in-house and 
contracting efforts in the area of prevention comes from federal sources such as 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Id. 
 31.  See CAROLINE PALMER, UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES TO STOP SEXUAL                                         
VIOLENCE (2010), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/MCASA 
_UnderstandingRelationshipBetweenPrevIntervenSV_3-2010.pdf. 
 32.  TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 27 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC INJURY RESEARCH AGENDA 2009–2018 (2009), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/injury/ResearchAgenda/CDC_Injury_Research 
_Agenda-a.pdf). 
 33.  PALMER, supra note 31, at 3.  Note that the Minnesota Department of 
Human Services formed, under court order, a Sex Offender Civil Commitment 
8
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III. RELEVANT HISTORY OF SYSTEM RESPONSES TO SEXUAL            
VIOLENCE IN MINNESOTA 
It is helpful to review some of the legislative and other public 
policy responses to sexual violence in Minnesota before moving 
forward to analyze the benefits of stronger integration of 
prevention and intervention responses.  Many of these reforms 
emerged in the 1970s in an attempt to “craft a legal system that 
better reflects modern society’s norms and expectations relating to 
sexual assault cases.”34  But even with these changes, conviction 
rates for sexual assault “remain the lowest for any serious felony.”35 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412, one example of an early legal 
reform, bars evidence of a victim’s past sexual conduct from being 
admitted at trial except in narrow circumstances.36  Commonly 
referred to as the “rape shield law,” Rule 412 has its foundation in 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.347.  Despite trial protections of a 
sexual assault victim’s character and past sexual activities being a 
more contemporary issue,37 the rape shield became law in 1975 
amid sweeping reform to Minnesota’s treatment of sex crimes.38  
Buried beneath criticism of a slow-moving legislature and debates 
about gas taxes and handgun control, the reform received little 
attention.39  Nonetheless, the statutes enacted on the last day of the 
1975 legislative session of the Minnesota legislature are the basis for 
the current sex crimes within the Minnesota Criminal Code.40 
 
Advisory Task Force in October 2012.  See Larry Oakes, Magnuson Leads Task Force 
on Sex Offender Treatment, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 7, 2012, at A7, available at 
2012 WLNR 21340608. 
 34.  Long et al., supra note 18, at 574 (citing Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: 
Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
957, 961 (2008)). 
 35.  Id. at 575 (citing David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in 
the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1210 (1997)); see also 
Jane Kim, Comment, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
263, 264 n.8 (2012). 
 36.  Such evidence is only admissible when the “probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature” 
and either the defense is raising “consent of the victim” as a defense or “the 
prosecution’s case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy or disease.”  MINN. R. 
EVID. 412(1). 
 37.  See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 282 (Minn. 2011). 
 38.  See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1243, 1249–50. 
 39.  See Legislators, Legislature Get Poor Marks, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Aug. 31, 1975, 
at 1A. 
 40.  All references herein to “criminal code” shall mean the Minnesota 
Criminal Code unless stated otherwise.  See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 8, 1975 
9
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The reform diversified the nature of criminal sexual conduct 
and abandoned more primitive notions of offender accountability, 
improving understanding about the limits of consent and who 
holds the power of consent.  Prior to 1975, the criminal code 
division labeled “sex crimes” contained eleven sections that failed 
to create culpability for most sexual violence.41  For example, 
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.291 and 609.292, titled “aggravated 
rape” and “rape,” respectively, only accounted for forced sexual 
intercourse by a man against a woman who is not the man’s wife.42  
Minnesota Statutes section 609.296, “indecent liberties,” also 
created a spousal exception.  Furthermore, unless the sexual 
violence involved a child, these were the only mechanisms by which 
a person could be held liable for sexual assault. 
In 1975, the legislature repealed the “aggravated rape,” “rape,” 
and “indecent liberties” statutes; the replacements are present-day 
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.341 through 609.3451, which have 
had some changes since 1975 but not any sort of wholesale 
overhaul.  These statutes use the phrase “criminal sexual conduct,” 
a phrase absent from the criminal code prior to 1975, to represent 
varying degrees of sexual violence.  By eliminating outdated 
notions of sexual violence, such as the spousal exception, and 
broadening the conduct constituting an offense, the legislature 
began to recognize the complexity of sexual violence.  Since 1975, 
this recognition has grown as cognizance of sexual violence has 
become greater.  Offenses such as solicitation of minors for sexual 
acts,43 nonconsensual contact with a sexual intent,44 and sex 
trafficking45 are examples of the legislature’s attempts to cast a 
wider net on the problem of sexual violence. 
However, as the culpability net has widened, the legislative 
considerations for victims have failed to keep pace.  In addition to 
the rape shield law, the 69th Legislature passed Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.35, which codified a county’s obligation to pay for 
medical expenses related to examining a sexual assault victim.46  
These two sections symbolize a rarity in the politics surrounding 
sexual violence: victim-focused policy.  Today, thirty-two statutes 
 
Minn. Laws 1243, 1249–50. 
 41.  See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.291–.295 (1974). 
 42.  Id. §§ 609.291–.292 (repealed 1975). 
 43.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.281–.284 (2012). 
 44.  See id. § 609.321. 
 45.  See id. § 609.322. 
 46.  See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 11, 1975 Minn. Laws 1243, 1251. 
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compose the “sex crimes” division of chapter 609 of the criminal 
code.47  Of those thirty-two, only three (one addition since 1975) 
are aimed at victims.48 
Notably, Minnesota Statutes chapter 611A is intended to aid 
victims of crime generally.  Chapter 611A contains sections that 
allow for the creation of sexual violence victim services, but without 
appropriate and consistent funding, the efficacy of these sections 
fails.  Punishment, not restitution, has become the rule for sexual 
violence policy.  The offender focus of the legislature has become 
perhaps most vivid in the last two decades with the evolution in 
application of Minnesota’s sex offender laws. 
A. Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program 
When determining whether to commit a sex offender, the 
State of Minnesota initially relied upon a 1939 law that allowed for 
the civil commitment of individuals with sexual psychopathic 
personalities.49  After the law was immediately challenged on 
constitutional grounds, the Minnesota Supreme Court established 
the standard to determine whether one is apt for civil commitment: 
“an utter lack of power to control [one’s] sexual impulses.”50  The 
law remained almost dormant until high-profile sexual assaults in 
the 1980s led to its revival.51  Yet, as of 1990, less than thirty 
individuals were in the state’s civil commitment program.52  Since 
1990, there have been two important changes to the commitment 
process—one procedural and one substantive.  Both of these 
changes were exacerbated by two high-profile events involving sex 
offenders. 
Prior to 1991, county attorneys were charged with identifying 
possible candidates for the civil commitment program.53  If the 
county attorney deemed an individual to meet the “lack of power to 
 
 47.  See §§ 609.293–.353. 
 48.  Enacted in 1984, Minnesota Statutes section 609.3471 keeps information 
pertaining to a minor sexual assault victim confidential. 
 49.  See § 253B.02, subdiv. 18b. 
 50.  ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND 
THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 29 (2006) (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v. 
Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)). 
 51.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT: 
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 4–5 (2011), available at http://www.auditor 
.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf. 
 52.  Id. at 3. 
 53.  Id. at 4. 
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control” standard, the county attorney could file a petition for a 
hearing.  At that hearing, a judge (never a jury) would hear the 
case for civil commitment, and the State would be charged with 
meeting a burden of “clear and convincing evidence.”  A would-be 
commitment had a right to appeal a judicial decision to commit.  
In 1991, the Department of Corrections began referring possible 
civil commitment candidates to the county attorney,54 thus 
reducing the “legwork” county attorneys had to perform and easing 
their ability to commit offenders.  The referral procedure, coupled 
with the pre-1991 procedure, is the current process for civilly 
committing sex offenders. 
In 1992, the State recommended Dennis Darol Linehan for 
the civil commitment program.  The State argued that Linehan, 
after spending nearly thirty years in jail for rape and murder, 
should be committed because he had been a bad person, not 
because he had an “utter lack of power to control” his sexual 
impulses.55  A trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
agreed.  However, in 1994 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
overturned the commitment, holding Linehan did not meet the 
high threshold ignored by the lower courts—“utter lack of power to 
control.”56  Despite Linehan’s somewhat advanced age (fifty-three 
in 1994) and the fact that his release would be supervised, media 
and public outcry caused the legislature to act.57  In a special 
session convened in the aftermath of Linehan’s non-commitment, 
the legislature passed the current standard for the commitment of 
sex offenders.58  A person with “sexual psychopathic personality” 
still qualifies for civil commitment, but a lower threshold of 
“sexually dangerous person” also qualifies an individual for 
commitment.59  The latter standard has three elements: (1) past 
harmful sexual conduct; (2) sexual, personality, or other mental 
disorder or dysfunction; and (3) recidivist risk. 
In the face of the substantive change to civil commitment 
jurisprudence, in 2000 the Minnesota Sex Offender Program had 
grown to 149 individuals60 (a large increase from 1990 but low 
compared with the current population).  In 2003, the number of 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  JANUS, supra note 50, at 29–30. 
 56.  See id. at 30 (referring to the Pearson standard). 
 57.  See id. at 31–32. 
 58.  See id. at 32. 
 59.  See MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subdiv. 1 (2012). 
 60.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 3. 
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commitments rose dramatically in response to outrage over the 
tragic rape and murder of college student Dru Sjodin by a non-
committed sex offender who had been recently released from a 
Minnesota correctional facility.61  Pressured by the Governor, the 
Department of Corrections began referring large numbers of 
convicted sex offenders to county attorneys in hopes that another 
sex offender would not “slip through.”  In the five years following 
the tragic events surrounding Sjodin’s death, the Department of 
Corrections referred 157 sex offenders per year to county 
attorneys; in the previous twelve years, the Department of 
Corrections had referred a total of 333 sex offenders for civil 
commitment.62  The procedural and substantive changes 
implemented by 2003 resulted in two-thirds of current “clients” of 
the Minnesota Sex Offender Program being committed between 
2004 and 2012.63 
In 2010, the Legislative Auditor evaluated the sex offender 
program and returned unsettling results.  Each commitment costs 
the State of Minnesota approximately $120,000 per year, almost 
three times as much as an inmate in Minnesota’s prisons.64  The 
program is predicted to grow at a rate slightly under ten percent 
for the next ten years (approximately fifty-three new commitments 
each year), totaling 1109 commitments in 2020.65  Thus far, the 
predicted growth rate has proved accurate as the sex offender 
program had 683 clients as of March 31, 2013.66  The underlying 
sexually violent offenses that each offender committed should not 
be minimized; however, such growth is unsustainable. 
Given that the Legislative Audit Committee is comprised of 
both Democrats and Republicans from both legislative bodies, 
lawmakers are cognizant of the unsustainability of such growth.  
With that awareness, seeking alternative means by which to combat 
 
 61.  Id. at 17. 
 62.  Id. at 5.  
 63.  See DENNIS BENSON ET AL., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM: WORKING 
TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.state.mn 
.us/main/groups/agencywide/documents/pub/dhs16_166449.pdf; Minnesota Sex                              
Offender Program Overview, MINN. DEPARTMENT HUMAN                                                      
SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_ 
CONVERSION&dDocName=dhs16_149914&RevisionSelectionMethod 
=LatestReleased (last updated Apr. 3, 2013 3:02 PM).  The authors combined the 
statistical information from these two sources in order to calculate this number. 
 64.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 1. 
 65.  Id. at 4–5. 
 66.  Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, supra note 63.  
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sexual violence seems to be the next logical step.  However, current 
policy still fails to account for prevention-focused policy as a 
legitimate method for curbing sexual violence and a wise outlet for 
state funds that can complement ongoing intervention-based 
responses. 
B. Practical Concerns 
All commitments to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program are 
considered “clients” receiving treatment for their disorders, and all 
have been committed following prison sentences for sexual 
violence.67  Theoretically, they cannot be prisoners (and must be 
clients), or it would result in constitutional violations regarding 
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.  The United States 
Supreme Court dismissed these concerns by finding that civil 
commitment following a prison term is not punitive in nature.68  
However, in 1982 the Court ruled that a person civilly committed 
for a mental disorder must be receiving adequate treatment or 
such commitment violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.69  Some courts have applied this 
condition to the civil commitment of sex offenders, and a failure to 
provide appropriate treatment has resulted in injunctive relief.70  
Within these cases lurks an alarming possibility: civil commitment 
may be a veneer for preventative detainment.  Such concerns are 
beginning to arise in Minnesota because of the large number of 
offenders being committed and the low number being released 
(only one thus far).  The most recent manifestation of these 
concerns is the certified class action by clients of the sex offender 
program against the Minnesota Department of Human Services.71 
Another concern is the high number of individuals Minnesota 
commits.  Of the twenty states that operate sex offender civil 
commitment programs, Minnesota commits the most per capita 
and has the third most in gross commitments behind Florida and 
California.72  As noted above, each individual in Minnesota’s sex 
offender program remains there at a cost of approximately 
 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370–71 (1997). 
 69.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982). 
 70.  Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 71.  See Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2012 WL 6044652 (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 
2012). 
 72.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 16–18. 
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$120,000 per year.73  The sex offender program operates at a 
budget of approximately $70 million annually.74  Absent a decrease 
in commitments and/or large-scale releases, the money needed to 
operate the sex offender program will continue to rise at alarming 
rates.  And yet, while the legislature continues to fund the 
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, it allocates zero dollars for the 
prevention of sexual violence.  Furthermore, taking the 
legislature’s approach to sexual violence as a whole, it spends more 
money on sexual offenders than it does on victims of sexual 
offenses.75 
IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT POLICY RESPONSE: THE PROBLEM             
OF INDUCTION 
The history of the policy response to sex offender 
management is defined by fear and reactionary politics.  This is 
understandable; sexual violence is an emotionally charged issue 
with high public interest.  In the wake of events such as Linehan’s 
controversial release and the tragedy of Sjodin’s death, the public 
demands immediate actions to ensure safety needs are met, and its 
representatives act with little heed to the costs (both monetary and 
societal).  Unfortunately, groups focused on sexual violence 
prevention receive less attention and, as a result, less funding.  This 
course of action results in a tunneling of our focus.  According to 
Eric Janus, as described in his book Failure to Protect, “We have 
restricted our focus to the ‘downstream’ part of the problem—
those individuals who continue to offend even after they have gone 
to prison—and have rendered less visible the ‘upstream,’ but much 
larger, aspect of the problem.”76 
Although seemingly academic, there is another manner in 
which to characterize the problem that plagues the rationale 
behind sexual violence policy: the problem of induction.  The 
problem of induction was championed by nineteenth century 
British philosopher David Hume (although he did not explicitly 
call it such) in response to his concerns about causal inferences.  
Hume worried that over-reliance on past experience could lead 
 
 73.  $117,000 per resident in 2010; $122,000 per resident in 2011.  Id. at 12. 
 74.  Range in the last four years: $75 million in 2008 to $67.5 million in 2011.  
Id. 
 75.  In 2006, Minnesota spent $130.5 million on sexual offenders and $90.5 
million on victims of sexual violence.  MILLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–10. 
 76.  JANUS, supra note 50, at 50. 
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one to believe that nature behaves in a uniform manner despite 
our experience demonstrating otherwise.  Put simply, the problem 
of induction is creating a general rule from an isolated experience; 
the “problem” is unsound reasoning because there is a lack of 
necessary causation.  For example, if the most recent sexually 
violent offender had traits x, y, and z, all sexually violent offenders 
will embody such traits.  Yet this type of erroneous reasoning 
continues to pervade sexual violence policy.  Simple existential 
awareness of the beliefs and presumptions that drive current sexual 
violence policy could improve future reasoning and promote 
sounder approaches. 
More contemporary work has proliferated that further 
explicates the poor reasoning underlying current sexual violence 
policy.  In 2007, epistemologist Nassim Taleb77 advanced the 
problem of induction through his “Black Swan Theory.”  The idea 
stems from the following fallacious example: It was once thought 
only white swans existed because only white swans had ever been 
observed; when a black swan was observed, it had a profound 
impact because it undermined current “understanding.”  Such is 
the course of a “black swan event.”  Taleb warns against the black 
swan event because the less it is accounted for, the greater impact it 
will have.  At the same time, black swan events are not predictable, 
and they are not objective; they result from overconfidence in 
knowledge and a failure to recognize epistemic limitations.78  The 
gravity of a black swan event results from the event being outside 
“the usual” and the (sometimes extreme) over-reliance on 
recurring but not necessary recurring events.  However, their effects 
can be mitigated by checking what we think we “know” and by not 
attempting to retrospectively justify the events as foreseeable, thus 
circumventing the notion that such events were ever outside our 
knowledge. 
Perhaps most importantly, Taleb is not engaged in a purely 
academic exercise—he is concerned with the effect epistemic 
arrogance has on our everyday lives.  This is because when 
pervasive false beliefs are unsettled, the consequences are 
magnified.  The rationale underlying sexual violence policy fits 
 
 77.  Nassim Nicholas Taleb is a Lebanese-born epistemologist who focuses on 
the problems of luck, uncertainty, and probability.  He holds a professorship at 
New York University’s Polytechnic Institute.   
 78.  NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE, AT xxiii (2d ed. 2010). 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/6
 
1600 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:5 
squarely within Taleb’s paradigm.  High profile, widely reported 
events like rape or murder lead people to believe such events are 
“the norm” instead of the rarity.  Furthermore, it is believed that 
the same small group of people is responsible for this “norm.”  This 
false norm, coupled with the illusory belief that most sexual 
violence is committed by strangers (i.e., stranger danger), results in 
policies that are highly reactionary to soothe the general fear of the 
public.  Yet most individuals who commit sexually violent acts 
resulting in prison sentences have no prior history of a violent 
offense, and sex offenders with a prior conviction for a sexual 
offense comprise only fourteen percent of those in prison for 
sexual violence.79  Furthermore, it is estimated that in most sexual 
assaults the victim knows the perpetrator; approximately fifteen 
percent of those in prison for sexual assault claim their victim was a 
stranger to them.80  Finally, even though these statistics 
demonstrate violent sexual offenses do not fit the common 
stereotype, a substantial proportion of sexual violence goes 
unreported, and thus, these statistics may be inflated.81  Ignorance 
of common facts about sexual violence coupled with a failure to 
account for the sexual violence that is unseen leads to a failure to 
make comprehensive sexual violence policy. 
Data defying what is believed to be the “norm” demonstrate 
that the legislature’s sexual violence policies are a result of 
epistemological arrogance (i.e., believing that all sexual offenders 
fit the same traits).  When a rare, high profile event (i.e., black 
swan event) occurs, such as the Sjodin tragedy, the public and 
legislature consider such an event as an affirmation of their 
“knowledge” (e.g., stranger danger, high recidivism) instead of an 
unpredictable aberration.  This type of reasoning creates an 
inconsistency whereby people are reacting abnormally to what they 
perceive as normal.  Meanwhile, the bulk of sexual violence never 
figures into the equation.  Instead of over-relying on the usual (e.g., 
intra-family sexual violence) and being shocked by the rare event 
(e.g., the Sjodin tragedy), the rare event is relied upon as “the 
usual.”  When this “usual” occurs, it has the shock effect of the rare 
(because it is in fact a rare event).  This is directly in line with 
Taleb’s warnings.  The black swan event cannot be predicted, only 
hedged.  Our false perceptions (i.e., epistemic arrogance) amplify 
 
 79.  JANUS, supra note 50, at 43. 
 80.  Id. at 46; see also TRUMAN, supra note 17, at 9. 
 81.  JANUS, supra note 50, at 46–47. 
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the reaction to the rare (black swan) event.  Instead of focusing on 
that which can be known, such is ignored in the quixotic quest to 
prevent an event outside our epistemic range.  To reify, by 
believing the infrequent, horrific sexually violent act can be 
predicted (and thus prevented), the majority of sexual violence 
goes unheeded and the focus of sexual violence policy continues in 
vain. 
In the wake of rare, shocking sexual violence, the reasoning 
behind policy for the last two decades has been that such assaults 
were “foreseeable” if only the “right factors” would have been 
noticed.  This narrative fallacy82 has led to the procedural and 
substantive changes occurring in sex offender policy; legislatures 
believe the rare, unpredictable event is within their power to 
prevent.  As such, significant resources (via Department of 
Corrections referrals, county attorney assessments, and the 
Minnesota Sex Offender Program) are devoted to detaining 
previously convicted sex offenders and creating obstacles to 
rejoining society for released sex offenders.  Consequently, little or 
no resources are allocated to programs that focus daily on 
preventing common sexual violence (seen and unseen) because 
such efforts do not fit in the fight against the (false) paradigm. 
V. UNITING INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION RESPONSES 
There is a growing understanding that the simple 
solutions offered by legislative policies broadly applied to 
every offender have not been effective in keeping children 
safe or preventing sexual abuse.  Furthermore, the 
isolation and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex 
offenders and their families have generated a number of 
unintended consequences that limit family, community, 
and societal ability to prevent sexual abuse in the first 
place.  Tough restrictive policies . . . are applied broadly 
and typically do not recognize the continuum of behaviors 
of sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who sexually 
abuse, and the range of risk posed by sex offenders to re-
 
 82.  Taleb uses the phrase “narrative fallacy” in a similar manner as post hoc 
rationalizations.  See TALEB, supra note 78, at 62–84.  The narrative fallacy is our 
(i.e., humans’) inability to look at a series of events without giving the events an 
explanation (i.e., narration).  Id. at 63–64.  By linking events together through 
perceived causes (real or imaginary), those events “make more sense” to us but 
also give us a false sense of understanding (which exacerbates the black swan 
event).  Id. at 64. 
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offend.83 
MNCASA has advanced several legislative proposals in recent 
years with varying degrees of success.  MNCASA’s annual policy 
agenda, developed with the assistance of a multidisciplinary 
committee, typically has three sections, addressing sexual violence 
prevention, support and care for victims, and access to justice.  The 
policy agenda recognizes that a well-rounded legislative response 
takes into account primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention 
approaches. 
MNCASA’s legislative agenda is generally met with bipartisan 
support, so any barriers to passage tend to come from fiscal impact 
(costs to the system such as prison beds) rather than philosophical 
or political difference.  For example, over the past four years, 
MNCASA has worked with supportive legislators on both sides of 
the aisle to propose two noncontroversial bills: presumptive 
executed sentencing for repeat sex offenders and enhancement 
from a gross misdemeanor to a felony for repeat fifth-degree 
criminal-sexual-conduct convictions.84  The former addresses an 
omission when the sentencing guidelines were changed in 2006, 
and the latter recognizes that some sex offenders engaged in 
nonconsensual sexual contact could conceivably be convicted of 
the same crime over and over yet never reach a higher level of 
accountability.85 
These bills are primarily concerned with system intervention 
for a sex offender, but there are prevention aspects as well: namely, 
identifying someone who has a propensity to re-offend.  While it 
cannot be proven that an offender who repeatedly commits a low-
level criminal sexual conduct crime in the fifth degree will 
“graduate” to more serious sex crimes, heightened scrutiny will 
lead ideally to more system involvement with the offender and 
perhaps better opportunities to prevent future crimes. 
The costs associated with these two bill proposals are relatively 
low (each comes in under $100,000 in the first year with 
comparative amounts in the subsequent years), and yet they cannot 
seem to move at all through the legislature because of the 
 
 83.  TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 42.  
 84.  During the 2011–12 biennium, HF660/SF415 and HF532/SF794, 
respectively.  See H.F. 660, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.F. 794, 87th. Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.F. 532, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.F. 415, 
87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011). 
 85.  See Minn. H.F. 660; Minn. S.F. 794; Minn. H.F. 532; Minn. S.F. 415. 
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associated costs related to more prison resources.  Meanwhile, costs 
incurred by the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, for example, 
continue to rise at an alarming annual rate, and the legislature 
continues to support these costs, although with the recognition 
that they are not sustainable.86  While fiscal caution is 
understandable given the significant state budget cuts in recent 
years, a small investment in early intervention and possible 
prevention seems like a reasonable price to pay.  In the absence of 
a cost-benefit analysis to support a sure connection between policy 
change, fiscal investment, and a successful system response, it still 
seems prudent to make small yet targeted changes in the criminal 
sexual conduct laws that ensure ongoing system involvement with 
repeat offenders and create the potential to prevent future 
crimes.87 
A successful bill from the 2012 legislative session requires the 
Minnesota Department of Health to report on sexual violence 
incidence and prevalence data.88  Data collected from various 
sources will help to inform policy proposals on sexual violence in 
the future, promoting a more evidence-based approach.  Data can 
be useful in evaluating both prevention- and intervention-oriented 
legislative responses to sexual violence. 
One area of controversy in the public policy arena is around 
the issue of comprehensive sexual health education.  This concept 
does not enjoy bipartisan support; there are political and 
philosophical differences about who should teach youth about 
sexuality and sexual health, and what information should be shared 
with youth.  In the past, MNCASA has supported bills (none of 
which passed) with its community partners in the Coalition for 
 
 86.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 1. 
 87.  A cost-benefit analysis of legislative policy regarding criminal sexual 
conduct laws would be a welcome addition to this discussion.  A recent analysis of 
government-funded intervention in the lives of homeless and sexually exploited 
girls, for example, showed a return of thirty-four dollars for every one dollar spent.  
LAUREN MARTIN & RICHARD LOTSPEICH, EARLY INTERVENTION TO AVOID SEX TRADING 
AND TRAFFICKING OF MINNESOTA’S FEMALE YOUTH: A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 60 
(2012), available at http://www.miwrc.org/system/uploaded_files/0000/0147 
/Benefit-Cost-Study_Full_Report_9-4-2012.pdf.  For other discussions of cost-
benefit analyses in the context of sex offender policy, see Janus, supra note 1; 
Robert A. Prentky & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis, in CHILD TRAUMA I: ISSUES AND RESEARCH 417 (Ann Wolbert Burgess 
ed., 1992).  
 88.  Sue Hegarty, A Positive Balance, SESSION WKLY., May 25, 2012, at 33, 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/sessionweekly/art.asp?ls_year=87    
&issueid_=78&storyid=3200&year_=2012.  
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Responsible Sex Ed89 because a better understanding of sexuality, 
particularly among young people, provides a gateway opportunity 
for discussions about the prevention of sexual violence, coercive 
behaviors, what consent really means, and other related issues.90  
Comprehensive sexual health education also plays an important 
role in related public policy discussions, such as how to respond to 
“sexting,” bullying, and sexual harassment, particularly amongst 
youth.91  So, even as lawmakers consider intervention-style 
approaches to dealing with these sorts of problems, there should 
always be a prevention message attached. 
Finally, MNCASA’s legislative agenda is driven by guiding 
principles.  With regard to the system response to sex offenders, 
MNCASA continues to see civil commitment as one option within a 
preferably wide-ranging system response, particularly for the most 
dangerous perpetrators.  It also recognizes the need for less 
restrictive alternatives to secure facility commitments for some 
other offenders who present less of a risk to the public (including 
re-entry programs providing better opportunities for housing and 
employment) and always maintains that continued meaningful 
financial support for victim services is essential.92 
Various options should be considered, such as indeterminate 
sentencing, specialized courts, and sex offender review boards 
charged with determining the terms of release.  The Department of 
Human Services Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task 
Force will look at these and many other potential 
recommendations during the 2013 legislative session and beyond.93  
 
 89.  See COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE SEX ED, http://www.coalitionforsexed 
.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  
 90.  See ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, COMPREHENSIVE SEX EDUCATION: RESEARCH AND 
RESULTS 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage 
/advfy/documents/fscse.pdf; CAROLINE PALMER, WHY SEXTING IS VEXING 5                              
(2010), available at http://www.mncasa.org/Documents/policy_organizing_17 
_3683469455.pdf. 
 91.  See PALMER, supra note 90, at 5; see also Connection Between Bullying and 
Sexual Violence Perpetration, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 11, 
2012), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/bullying_sv.html. 
 92.  See TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 2–4. 
 93.  For a review of the Task Force’s meeting minutes and resource materials, 
see Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force, MINN. DEPARTMENT. HUMAN 
SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC 
_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&dDocName=dhs16 
_171337 (last updated Mar. 29, 2013 3:05 PM).  The Task Force composition is 
multidisciplinary with members including representatives from judicial, legislative 
(bipartisan), law enforcement, prosecutorial, defense, victim service, treatment, 
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Many of these issues were explored in great detail by the 
Governor’s Commission on Sex Offender Policy, and it is certain 
that the Task Force will also be looking to such areas as less 
restrictive alternatives to secure facility commitments, sentencing 
practices, changes to the criminal sexual conduct laws, funding, 
and prevention.94 
In addition, MNCASA would like to see greater attention paid 
to increased access to sex offender treatment policies for 
adolescents and children with sexual behavior problems, cross-
agency coordination of existing state intervention and prevention 
services to maximize the policy impact on primary prevention, and 
state funding for primary prevention services.  Concurrently, 
support for sexual assault victim advocacy services must be 
maintained with reasonable funding and more access to services in 
every county and reservation in Minnesota.  During the state 
government shutdown of 2011, the district court and special master 
recognized that sexual assault advocacy and crisis response 
programs are “critical core function[s] of government” and are 
“crucial to the safety of Minnesota communities.”95 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problem of sexual violence is endemic—its occurrence is 
steady, as opposed to spiking, like during an epidemic.  Its 
relatively unchanging nature also suggests a certain level of 
acceptance by society that some portion of the population will be 
subjected to this type of harm.  This is not to say that society or 
 
and county administration perspectives.  It will complete its work in December 
2013. 
 94.  See generally GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION, supra note 26.  Among the report’s 
many recommendations are the development of a blended determinate-
indeterminate sentencing system for sex offenders, creation of a Sex Offender 
Release Board, increasing the statutory maximum indeterminate sentencing to life 
for offenders with prior histories of criminal sexual conduct, increased penalties 
for specific statutory sections, specialized sex offender caseload supervision, 
special considerations for juvenile offenders, establishment of a Sex Offender 
Policy Board, evaluation of sex offender registry information, creation of a 
specialized panel for civil commitments, creating structured treatment options, 
review of collateral consequences attendant to a sex offense conviction, and many 
more.  Id. at 1–6. 
 95.  Special Master Recommendations Regarding Petition of Minnesota 
Coalition Against Sexual Assault at 3–4, In re Temporary Funding of Core 
Functions of the Exec. Branch of the State of Minn., No. 62-CV-11-5203 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/2 
/Public/Civil/Order_regarding_mn_casa.pdf. 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/6
 
1606 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:5 
policymakers are complacent about the problem, just that the 
response is misplaced at times, and, as a result, we have not 
witnessed a dramatic positive change.  This lack of success can feel 
defeating and demoralizing.  We are only seeing the black swans—
the aberrations that distract us—and failing to look more broadly 
to the expertise and experience that will help policymakers work 
toward the solutions that can create a difference.96 
According to Tabachnick and Klein, “When communities hold 
offenders accountable in thoughtful ways that prevent re-offense, 
they increase the likelihood that others will get the help they need 
before they perpetrate sexual abuse.”97  With each passing year, we 
learn more about the nature of sexual violence, about the people 
who commit the crimes, about the societal norms that promote 
unhealthy sexual images, and about the most effective policies 
using evidence-based measures.  The thoughtful response that 
Tabachnick and Klein put forth is one that balances prevention 
and intervention strategies in a comprehensive approach, one that 
is more proactive than reactive, and one that recognizes the 
specific needs of all involved (victims, offenders, and society as a 
whole).  In other words, the thoughtful response is perhaps the 
most difficult one of all, but as the problem of sexual violence 
persists and as public policy continues to miss the mark, it is the 
response that must be made. 
 
 
 96.  See supra Part IV. 
 97.  TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 5. 
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